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GUERRILLAS IN OUR MIDST: THE
ASSAULT ON RADICALS IN
AMERICAN LAW
Daria Roithmayr*
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN
AMERICAN LAW. By Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry. New

York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. 195. $25.

On October 9, 1997, radicals everywhere celebrated the thirtieth
anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the revered Cuban and
South American rebel known as much for his guerrilla manifestos
as for his scraggly facial hair and the black beret positioned slightly
askance.
At the same time Latin Americans and revolutionaries were
marking the death of their beloved Che, Professors Daniel Farber
and Suzanna Sherry were publishing their long-awaited book, Be
yond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law.
The professors' timing was, unintentionally, quite appropriate.
Like many of Che's manifestos, the book sounds an ideological call
to arms, urging liberals to root out the insurgents of radical legal
theory, which threatens the very foundations of American Law,
legal culture, and, indeed, life as we know it. Or so the authors
would have us believe.
The very subtitle of the book - "The Radical Assault on Truth
in American Law" - conjures up a vision of crazy ideologues, de
scending on law schools in ever-increasing numbers,1 seeking to
subvert the academy and overthrow the Enlightenment as they rush
to man the barricades. Playing on an already well-developed "Che
anxiety" in liberals and conservatives,2 the authors paint radical
scholars as dangerous subversives, skulking about darkly in the an
nals of American law reviews and planting seeds of treason against
the all-sacred Truth in the minds of impressionable young law stu
dents. Thumbing through the first chapter, we can almost picture
angry radical scholars, dark-skinned fanatics in their Che berets,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.S. 1984, Univer
sity of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1990, Georgetown.
Ed.
1. Over 300 people attended the last national conference on Critical Race Theory, held at
Yale Law School in November 1997. Conversation with Harlon Dalton, Professor of Law,
Yale, and co-organizer for the Conference on Critical Race Theory, February 5, 1998.
2. See Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEG. Enuc. 222 (1984) (warning law
schools to oust the nihilistic Critical Legal Studies scholars in the academy).
-
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Army fatigues and camouflage war paint, overturning tables and
toting fearsome black Uzis, with bayonets ready to slice through the
most well-reasoned judicial opinion.3 There is' much to fear from
these infiltrators, advise Farber and Sherry, despite the fact that
radical scholars are in the minority on law school campuses. "War
and ideas are difficult to contain" (p. 5).
In direct contrast to the disorder and violence of this lunatic
fringe,4 Farber and Sherry position themselves as soothingly ra
tional and moderate, acolytes of a calm, well-reasoned pragmatism
that concedes where it must, but fights to vanquish the threat of
violent chaos with superior logic and reason. We picture Farber
and Sherry, well-dressed not in natty bow tie and smart Nord
strom's business ensemble (as illustrated on the inside of the book
jacket),5 but in ethereal, appropriately Socratic garb - perhaps
translucent white robes - with the Light of Truth and Reason shin
ing down upon their earnest, upturned faces.
In their book, these soldier-scholars of goodness and light argue
in increasingly rising tones that we cannot give up our faith in Rea
son and Truth - without it, we are left to the dictates of the dark
side, where force, violence, and power are the only way to adjudi
cate competing claims. Radical theory is also condemnable for
other reasons: it is anti-Semitic and it distorts public discourse. But
above all else, radical theory is inevitably nihilist and politically to
talitarian. Without Truth, we have no hope of protecting the dis
empowered or of adjudicating between competing philosophies.
Without the shield of the Enlightenment, we have no response to
those who would claim that the Holocaust never happened, and no
defense to those who would shoot us on the spot with no
explanation.6
3. This description plays off of the "Heart of Darkness" metaphor, used by critics in the
early 1980s to describe radical Critical Legal Studies scholars. See Louis B. Schwartz, With
Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REv. 41'.?, 413-22 (1984) (arguing
that CLS suffers from "remorseless savagery" and a "siege mentality").
4. Actually, Judge Richard Posner argues that Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and
Derrick Bell, all scholars of color who are targeted by Farber and Sherry, constitute the
"lunatic core" of the movement; the "rational fringe" of the movement is made up of Michel
Foucault, Stanley F!Sh, Duncan Kennedy, and Catherine MacKinnon, who, perhaps coinci
dentally, are all white. See Richard Posner, The Skin Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13,
1997, at 40 (reviewing Beyond All Reason).
5. Anyone (except for Judge Posner) who has ever met or seen pictures of some of the
radical scholars discussed in the book - in particular, Kim Cre�shaw (with flowing
dreadlocks), Patricia Williams (also a dread enthusiast), Gary Peller (formerly sporting a
long ponytail and unruly beard), and Richard Delgado (with wild, untamable mane of black
hair) - would quickly figure out who the guerrillas were, based on hairstyle comparisons
alone. But see Posner, supra note 4, at 41-42 (arguing that Delgado "looks like a direct de
scendant of Isabel and Ferdinand - he's as white as I am").
6. P. 71 (recounting the Holocaust story of a Jew who was ordered shot by the Nazis, to
argue that objective concepts of merit are necessary to prevent such tragedies).
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Yet something about the authors' argument catches our atten
tion. How is it that calm rationalism beats back the dangerous ni
hilism of ideological radical scholarship? How is it exactly that
reason goes about quelling the violence of Nazis and irrational radi
cal scholars? It does not take long to figure out - once the thought
occurs to us - that rationalism can displace anarchy and disorder
only if it possesses some coercive power of its own. Reason and
trut� can only quell the terrorist assault of radical theory if reason
and truth are actually weapons in a counter-counterinsurgency.7
That is, reason and truth must possess the coerciveness and violence
of Che's shiny Uzi, if truth is to function as the conversation
stopper, or right answer, that Farber and Sherry envision it to be.
And so it comes to pass that Farber and Sherry are revealed, not
as the descendants of Socrates, but only as Che Guevaras in law
professor clothing, brave soldiers8 fighting a battle to defend a
political and legal ideology of their own.
* * *

The foregoing introduction is meant to be a lighthearted - and
therefore very serious - poke at the earnestness with which Farber
and Sherry undertake their mission of warning the world against
radical legal theory. Despite their penchant for drama, or perhaps
because of it, Beyond All Reason is quite a provocative book, the
first large-scale attempt-to provide the rationalist response to radi
cal legal thought. The book is a collection (with substantial revision
and reorganization) of several law review articles coauthored by the
authors, together with several articles written by each individually.
The collection does a nice job of integrating these former articles
and essays· into a coherent whole, and of attempting a comprehen
sive indictment of radical legal theory and defense of Enlighten
ment rationalism.
Great organization does much of the trick. In the first part of
the book, Farber and Sherry attempt to document the radical cri
tique, "explor[ing] the tenets of radical multiculturalism" and try
ing "to establish that there are indeed a number of prominent legal
scholars who are taking quite extreme positions about truth, merit,
legal reasoning" (p. 11).
7. See Gary Peller, Reason and the Mob, 2 Tn<KUN 28, 92 {1989) ("[I]t strikes us as ini
tially dissonant that the intellectuals are asked to 'quell' the mob. The very ability of the
intellect to 'quell' suggests that in some way the intellectuals are like the mob, possessing
coercive power. Yet it was the potential for the mob to coerce that justified its regulation by
the intellectuals. The power of the intellect to 'quell' introduces the possibility that reason is
actually a means of discipline, a coercive technology for the social regulation of passion and
emotion. . . . Like the mob, reason promises a coerced social order based on a particular
social desire").
8. P. 14 (noting that the authors had been warned of the danger of writing the book);
Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7 (Book Review), at 46 (assert
ing that the authors "have taken a personal risk" in publishing their book).
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The second part of the book levies a three-pronged pragmatist
critique of radical legal 1 theory. First, . the authors argue, radical
legal theory is pragmatically undesirable because of its impact on
certain groups. In particular, the critique of merit is anti-Semitic
and anti-Asian because "[it] implies that Jews and Asian Americans
are unjustly favored in the distribution of social goods" (p. 11).
Second, radical legal theory produces unacceptable distortions in
scholarship and public discourse, because radical storytelling is
atypical and self-interested, which makes civil dialogue with critics
difficult if not impossible (pp. 72-94). Finally, radical legal theory is
nihilist because it accepts all competing viewpoints and arguments
and cultures as equally valid, thus eliminating any defense against
those who deny the existence of the Holocaust or promote totalitar
ianism (pp. 95-117). In general, the authors argue, we should em
brace Enlightenment rationalism because it is better at promoting
equality, because it provides a way to choose between competing
viewpoints, and because it provides us with a strong defense against
evil.
Part I of this review sorts out the authors' rendition of radical
legal theory, and then sets out a more fully-fleshed-out account of
radical legal thought beyond the truncated version that Farber and
Sherry have provided. Part II examines the authors' rationalist de
fense of merit and argues that their defense eventually undermines
itself when pushed to its logical conclusion. Part III similarly
deconstructs the authors' argument .that radical theory degrades
public discourse. Finally, ·Part IV reviews.the authors' nihilism ar
gument, using it as a point of departure to contrast the authors'
overly conservative pragmatism with Richard Rorty's progressive
pragmatism, and then with a form of pragmatism that I call radical
pragmatism.
I. PUNCH LINES

0NLy

In Chapters -One and Two, Farber and Sherry attempt to docu
ment the views of prominent radical legal scholars, and to link their
critical arguments to such revolutionary concepts as storytelling
scholarship and hate speech proposals. The authors do a nice
enough job of tracing the origins of radical legal theory from real
ism to Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), and subsequently to Critical
Race Theory ("CRT"), Radical Feminism, and, more generally,
postmodernism.
The authors oversimplify a bit when they try to conflate Critical
Race Theory \vith postmodernism. In fact, many Critical Race The
ory scholars have rejected the pure post�odernist argument that
race is "socially constructed" and .therefore. meaningless as an es
sential category for making sense of social experiences. Scholars
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like Angela Harris argue that Critical Race Theory exhibits a ten
sion between the postmodern argument that race is a socially con
structed concept and the more modernist claim that race
nevertheless forms the basis for much of a person of color's experi
ence of social life.9
Farber and Sherry are also a bit off-base with their references to
schools of thought and their categorizing of particular authors.
With regard to the former, for example, they seem to find
postmodernism, deconstruction, and "social constructionism" to be
interchangeable,10 though most scholars on those subjects would
beg to differ.11 With regard to categorizing scholars, the authors
label Jerry Lopez as a critical race theorist, even though he and his
writing do not clearly fall within the genre.12 Similarly, they charac
terize Rob�rt Post as a solid liberal, and not at all radical, when
some of his writings on free speech appear to belie that
description.13
All might be forgiven in the name of simplifying ideas for the
lay audience, were it not for a more serious transgression that Far
ber and Sherry commit throughout the book. When sketching the
tenets of radical theory, the authors present the radical scholars'
conclusions without providing any of their underlying analysis or
explanation. Of course, conclusions without any supporting analy
sis are about as silly as punch lines without the set-up for the joke.
It may be that Farber and Sherry are rather ungenerously "setting
up" the radical scholars for the critique that radical theory is just
out to lunch. Or perhaps the authors are just not quite able to
grasp the analysis behind the radical argument. Indeed, if the radi
cal argument is as obviously silly as the authors suggest, one won
ders why the authors devoted a whole book to responding.
To be sure, the authors openly acknowledge their penchant for
cheating the radical arguments of their full force.14 But that does
9. See Angela Harris, Aftenvord: Other Americas, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1150, 1155 {1997)
("[C]ritical race theorists are constantly trying to expose the truth to the world, hoping
against hope that their other, unsullied America will rise up in righteous indignation and
sweep away injustice. . . . [C]ritical race theorists face a serious dilemma when they try to
speak truth to power.").
,
10. "The radicals' core beliefs go by many names: social constructionism, postmodern·
ism, deconstructionism. Don't let all the isms fool you . . . ." P. 23.
11. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995).
12. P. 39. Conversation with Gerald Lopez, Professor of Law, U.C.L.A., Jan. 25, 1998.
13. Compare pp. 6, 45 (Post has "applauded 'fidelity to reason"' and has criticized univer
sity hate speech regulations on the grounds of "public reason") with Robert G. Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 603, 683 (1990) (arguing that "the

boundaries of public discourse cannot be fixed in a neutral fashion" but inevitably must "be
defined by reference to ideological presuppositions").
14. P. 16 ("In the interest of brevity and readability, we have limited many of the direct
quotations from their works to a single sentence or less. . : . For readers who want to investi-
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not excuse them from their failure to engage the strongest version
of radical legal theory. Take, for example, this paragraph that ap
pears in Chapter 1:
Harvard law professor Duncan Kennedy, a founder of CLS, has ex
pressed 'a pervasive skepticism' about current societal standards:
"We just don't believe that it is real 'merit' that institutions measure,
anywhere in the system." "Judgments of merit," he says, "are inevita
bly culturally and ideologically contingent." Thus there can be no ob
jective standard of merit applicable to all groups within the society.
[Stanley] Fish states unequivocally that "there is no such thing as in
trinsic merit." [p. 31]

Of course, without the benefit of either Kennedy or Fish's sup
porting argument, most readers would find this argument more
than a little extreme. It appears less zany, however, in the full con
text of the supporting analysis and explanation. In fact, the text in
Kennedy's article immediately preceding his statement about judg
ments of merit provides both a more substantive analysis for his
argument and a more specific context for his conclusion:
[A particular piece of scholarship] can be judged only by reference to
a particular research tradition or scholarly paradigm, usually one
among many that might have won dominance in the field. Yet conclu
sions at the level of what is valuable or interesting are very often dis
positive in deciding which of two articles is better.
Once we acknowledge the possible existence of different research
traditions, or collective scholarly projects, we have to acknowledge
that the white male occupants of faculty positions have more than the
power to decide which performances are better. They have also had
the power to create the traditions or projects within which they will
make these judgments. It seems obvious that these traditions or
projects are culturally and ideologically specific products.15

Whether or not one agrees with Kennedy, his conclusion that
judgments of merit are inevitably ideological seems far more per
suasive than extreme when resituated in the context of his full argu
ment about research traditions.
Nor do Farber and Sherry provide Kennedy's analysis behind
his first statement that none of us believes that merit really works in
any system. From the rest of the article, readers discover that the
"we" in Kennedy's statement is not society at large but a much
smaller group of folks who have succeeded at elite institutions while
gate the radicals' writings more fully, the endnotes provide citations for every quotation and
paraphrase"). Unfortunately, the endnotes are quite sloppy. Rather than reference citations
individually as they appear, Farber and Sherry prefer to endnote whole paragraphs and sort
out the references via parentheticals after the quoted source. Deciphering which source goes
\vith which reference can become quite complicated and tedious, and often is imprecise. See,
e.g., p. 156 n.37 and accompanying text.
15. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 733.
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feeling alienated within them. And "we" don't believe in the idea
of objective and apolitical merit, not because we have lost our
minds, but because we think that
success is a function of particular knacks, some socially desirable (be
ing "smart") and some not (sucking up) - and of nothing more gran
diose . This is not rejection of the idea that some work is better than
other work. It is rejection of the institutional mechanisms that cur
rently produce such judgments, of the individuals who manage the
institutions, and of the substantive outcomes.16

Oddly enough, despite Kennedy's statement about some work
being better than other work, Farber and Sherry preface their cita
tion to Kennedy with a statement that radical theorists "reject the
possibility that one person could actually be a 'better A' than an
other" (p. 31). Indeed, Kennedy concludes that there are standards
for judging someone to be a better A, and that those standards are
a product of the social conventions that a particular group or insti
tution finds useful. But neither that idea nor the full flavor of Ken
nedy's claim comes through in Farber and Sherry's "Quotable
Quotes" version of radical theory.
In fact, great chunks of Farber and Sherry's primer on radical
legal theory look like a collection of provocative citations from au
thors, strung together for maximum effect, but without any support
ing analysis. At the end of a long paragraph full of citations, for
example, the authors present a partial reference to Patricia Wil
liams: "Words such as experienced and qualified are, according to
Patricia Williams, 'con words, shiny mirrors that work to dazzle the
eye."' 17 Again, the punch line without the joke looks a bit over
heated. Where has the rest of Williams's argument - the substan
tive part of it - gone?
In the unabridged version, Williams argues that merit standards
necessarily embody collective subjective preferences for certain
qualities or abilities.18 That fact does not make them necessarily
evil, according to Williams. "I wonder what a world 'without pref
erence' would look like anyway. . . . Preferential treatment isn't in
herently dirty." 19 More the focus of Williams's critique is that,
although merit standards are developed by particular people at a
particular place and in a particular historical time, conventional
thinking disguises merit standards as apolitical, objective, universal
measurements of ability and achievement.
16. Id. at 708.
17. P. 32 (quoting PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 103
(1991)).
18. See WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 102 ("The fundamental isolationism of individual
preference as an arbiter is quite different from the 'neutrality,' the 'blindness,' and the 'im
personality' used to justify the collectivized convenience of standardized preference.").
19. Id. at 102-03.
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Similarly in that vein, Williams criticizes the overtly political as
sociations that conservatives have created between affirmative ac
tion and "quotas, preference, reverse discrimination," as well as the
purportedly apolitical associations between conventional merit and
the concepts of "experienced" and "qualified." Williams argues
that such associations are misleading - and perhaps racist - be
cause they acontextually equate remedial affirmative action with in
tentional discrimination against people of color, and portray merit
as though it depended on something other than collective subjective
preference:
Thus, affirm ative action is very different from numerical quotas that
actively structure society so that certain classes of people remain un
preferred. "Quotas," "preference," "reverse discrimination," "exper
ienced," and "qualified" are con words, shiny mirror words that work
to dazzle the eye with their analogic evocation of other times, other
contexts, multiple histories. As a society, we have yet to look care
fully beneath them to see where seeds of prejudice are truly hidden.20

When the full statement is set forth, and the entire line of argu
ment laid out, Williams looks a little less like a member of the "lu
natic fringe" the authors try to portray her as, and much more like
the brilliant, sophisticated scholar that she is.
IL THE CRITIQUE

OF

MERIT

One of the more important moments of the book comes in the
chapter entitled "Is the Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?"(pp. 5271). In this chapter, Farber and Sherry devote a great amount of
time to denouncing the radical critique of merit for being anti
Semitic and anti-Asian-American to boot. Initially, Farber and
Sherry set out a somewhat oversimplified version of the radical cn
tique of merit, focusing on the argument that "the powerful define
standards of merit to reinforce their own dominance" (p. 53).
Farber and Sherry dispute that radical argument with the empii
ical claim that Jews and Asian Americans have enjoyed dispropor
tionate· success under conventional merit standards (pp. 57-58).
From that premise, the authors make two points. First, they argue
that the success of Jews and Asian Americans is inconsistent with
the radical argument that merit standards were constructed to ex
clude people of color (p. 56). Second, they assert that the radical
critique is anti-Semitic and anti-Asian, because the critique of merit
indicts the standards under which these groups have achieved their
success, and "implies that Jews and Asian Americans are unjustly
favored in the social distribution of goods."21 The better and more
20. Id. at 103.
21. Pp. 10-11; see also p. 61 ("[I]f standards of merit are socially constructed creations of a
racist society, the radicals must necessarily condemn Jews and Asians for succeeding.").
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likely argument, say the authors, is that Jews and Asian Americans
have succeeded in disproportionate numbers because their cultural
values happen to correspond with those required by objective merit
standards (pp. 59-60). "If objective merit is wholly irrelevant, it is
difficult to account for Jewish or Asian success" (p. 59).
Although the authors struggle to define "merit" and what
makes it "objective," they· appear to settle on the idea that merit
standards measure traits with objective value like talent and
achievement, rather than characteristics like race or wealth which
have no such value (p. 54). To deal with the question of what con
stitutes objective value, the authors suggest that we as a society can
settle on some widely shared criteria about what makes for a good
basketball player - Michael Jordan is a star by any measure - or a
beautiful performance of European classical music - Yo-Yo Ma,
perhaps (p. 54).
Ultimately, the authors set forth a quite conventionally rational
ist defense of objective merit:
. The meritocratic ideal is that positions in society should be based on
the abilities and achievements of the individual, rather than on char
acteristics such as family background, race, religion, or wealth. This
ideal requires that merit be objective in the sense of being definable
without regard to those personal characteristics . . . . Under this con
ventional view, the ultimate conception of merit is color-blind and
gender-blind. Its advocates believe that people are treated unjustly
and discriminated against when their merit is assessed according to
their status rather than according to the value of their traits or prod
ucts. Thus, for instance, under this conception of merit, racial dis
crimination "is irrational and unjust because it denies the individual
what is due hi.ill or her under the society's agreed standards of merit."
[pp. 54-55] [citation omitted]

A. Deconstructing Distinctions
As the passage above illustrates, the authors' claims about the
value of merit rely on a strong distinction between race-neutral
merit and race-conscious bias. According to the passage cited
above, merit is objective because it relies on standards that ration
ally relate to abilities and traits that are relevant to "the job" or
"the educational opportunity." Bias, in contrast, is subjective be
cause it relies on status-based traits like race or gender that are ir
relevant to performance on the job or in school.
This distinction collapses, however, if merit standards them
selves defer to and depend upon collective status-conscious and
race-conscious social biases. And such turns out to be the case. As
discussed in the next section, judgments about what counts as abil
ity or social value in general are necessarily collective subjective
assessments, which are based in large part on the historical contin-
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gency of a particular social, economic, and political·context. Shared
norms about merit are very much a function of social power, which
historically has been closely tied to the race, gender, and class of
those with power.
To use the authors' reference to music, for example, only the
opinions of a select group of European decisionmakers during a
particular historical period counted in deciding what constitutes
beautiful "classical" music. We say that Yo-Yo Ma's music has
merit not only because it has aesthetic appeal but also because we
defer to and depend on this European group's contingent "bias" for
music with these particular characteristics. At this point, it becomes
difficult if not impossible to distinguish merit criteria from bias.
Accordingly, if merit is just a particular form of socially acceptable
bias, then it loses the privilege with which Farber and Sherry defend
it.
B. Deconstruction Applied
Using this deconstructive line of argument, merit standards
themselves can be criticized as unfairly discriminatory. For exam
ple, under the recently implemented SP-1 admissions process, Uni
versity of California law schools rely heavily on the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) and on an applicant's grade point average
to measure the applicant's potential ability to do well in law school.
But the demand for high LSAT scores and GPAs constitutes subjec
tive collective bias by legal professionals for certain skills or charac
teristics. More importantly, those professional biases historically
were developed in an explicitly class-, gender-, and race-conscious
way.
As I have argued elsewhere, law school admissions standards,
and more generally many of the professional values in the legal
community were developed at a time when the profession affirma
tively and deliberately excluded blacks, Latina/os, and white
women.22 Moreover, legal educators developed the earliest proto
type of the LSAT in conjunction with a more general societal move
toward ability testing, a process explicitly designed to justify exclud
ing people of color and southern and eastern Europeans from edu
cational and professional opportunity.23 In short, the professional
values and merit standards that continue to govern the legal profes
sion today are the offspring of this race- and gender-conscious deci
sionmaking by the elite white male leaders of the profession, who
protected their status by excluding white women and people of
color from their ranks. In light of such history, it should come as no
22. See Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL.
1449, 1476-91 (1997).
23. See id. at 1487-91.

L. REv.
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great surprise that selection criteria like admissions standards for
law school continue to exclude people of color disproportionately.
In the context of law school admissions, then, Farber and
Sherry's argument in favor of merit can be used to challenge the
very merit criteria they seek to defend. If, as Farber and Sherry
argue, bias is to be condemned because it is race-conscious, status
oriented, arbitrary, and irrational, then as a matter of logic, race
conscious, status-oriented law school admissions standards ought to
be condemned for the same reasons. Unfortunately, because
"probing intellectual analysis" lies outside Farber and Sherry's area
of expertise (their words, not mine),24 they do not offer any re
sponse at a theoretical level to this radical critique of merit.
C.

The Model Minority Question: "If We Can Do It, Why
Can't You?"

Farber and Sherry's initial question remains: If professional val
ues and merit standards were developed in a race-conscious context
and in conjunction with affirmative efforts to keep immigrants and
blacks qut of the profession, how is it that Jews.and some groups of
Asians have enjoyed disproportionate success (pp. 59-60)? As a
preliminary matter, readers should question the inquiry's empirical
premise. In framing their question, Farber and Sherry inappropri
ately lump all Asian-American groups and Asians into the group
"Asians," and do not differentiate Chinese, Korean, and Japanese
Americans or foreign nationals, who for some professions have en
joyed disproportionate success, from other Asian-American groups
like Laotians, Cambodians, Hmong, and Vietnamese, whose in
come levels and levels of success are far below that of either whites
or Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans.25
In addition, Farber and Sherry inappropriately lump all people
of color together when they argu� that Asian and Jewish success
undermines the social construction theory of merit. Farber and
Sherry themselves acknowledge the possibility that differences in
cultural history between Jews and some Asian groups on the one
hand, and blacks and Latino/as on the other, might explain the dif
ference in success rates under socially constructed merit standards.
But they minimize that possibility by arguing that this explanation
is theoretically incompatible with the radical critique of merit.
First, they suggest that if cultural differences in fact do explain
differential success rates, it is because those differences are adap24. P. 9 {"Although not itself a theory, an ideology will typically be associated with fully
developed theories, which in turn can be subjected to probing intellectual analysis. Such a
critique [of radical multiculturalism] lies outside our expertise . . . )
25. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American Legal Scholarship, 1 AsrAN L.J. 1,
21 {1994).
"

.
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tive. That is, Jewish and Asian cultural values - perhaps an em
phasis on completion of formal education or mastery of the written
text - coincide with mainstream merit because Jewish and Asian
cultural performances are objectively meritorious cultural perform
ances (p. 60). That argument of course completely sidesteps the
original radical point that there exists no such creature as objective
merit.
Second, Farber and Sherry suggest that Jewish and some Asian
groups' disproportionate success is incompatible with the notion of
social construction. In particular, if white gentiles had indeed con
structed merit standards, they would not have allowed Jews and
some Asians to overtake them. "If the elite do construct the stan
dards for their own benefit, then white gentiles might allow Jews
and Asians to succeed, but they would not allow them to surpass"
(p. 60).
Farber and Sherry, however, do not take that analysis far
enough. It is possible that dominant groups historically constructed
merit standards that naturally favored their own cultural perform
ances, but that after formal discrimination wa� outlawed, groups
like Jews and som.e Asian groups in some professions began to out
perform them on the measures they constructed. In contrast, other
groups like Latino/as or African Americans, who had entirely dif
ferent social, political, and cultural histories, continued to be ex
cluded by those standards. This alternative explanation, completely
ignored by the· authors, is perfectly consistent with the radical cri
tique of merit.
Moreover, there is evidence that dominant groups have at
tempted to exclude those groups that might outperform them oh
merit-based measures. The authors themselves recognize that, at
least with regard to educational admissions, significant efforts have
been made to prevent Jews and Asians from "surpassing," by ex
panding merit to include "character" and "geographic diversity,"
and to keep out Asians and Asian Americans who score dispropor
tionately well on standardized tests by including criteria of "leader
ship" and "social and community involvement."26 Similarly,
negative stereotypes of Jews and Asians who succeed at certain
professions lend support to the idea that the dominant majority has
tried to prevent certain groups from outperforming them by stigmatizing them for their success.27
.

In any event, it would have been far more productive for Farber
and Sherry to undertake a historical inquiry about the groups they
discuss - to determine how Jews and some Asian and Asian-

26. Pp. 60-61. Farber and Sherry believe that such efforts are atypical and unrepresenta
tive. Id.
27. See generally Chang, supra note 25.
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American groups have participated in the development, or fared
under the operation, of conventional merit standards.28 Ahistorical
comparisons seem to be of little help, and appear to suggest that all
people of color are interchangeable, rather than members of differ
ent groups with different histories, different cultural traditions, and
different identities.
Farber and Sherry's analysis of Jewish and Asian success pro
vides evidence for, and not an argument against, the idea that dif
ferent racial and ethnic groups achieve different rates of success.
Indeed, their analysis reinforces Duncan Kennedy's earlier argu
ment that merit standards are in some way tied to the acquisition of
cultural capital or to the history of a particular group or ethnicity.
To acknowledge that claim in no way discounts the value of Jewish
and Chinese-, Korean-, and Japanese-American achievement; it
simply recognizes that the assessment of what constitutes a good
indicator for achievement in a particular profession, what consti
tutes appropriate education in that profession, and indeed how the
profession itself is structured, are all collectively subjective judg
ments that are inevitably culturally and historically specific.
III.

DEGRADING PUBLIC DISCOURSE: THE CRITIQUE
OF STORYTELLING

In Chapters Two and Four, Farber and Sherry pack a pretty pro
vocative punch when they argue against the genre of scholarship
called storytelling. Storytelling is a type of scholarship that relies
on descriptive narrative to redescribe conventional legal argument
or doctrine, and to expose new and fresh insights about legal insti
tutions. Some good examples of critical legal storytelling include
Patricia Williams's work, Richard Delgado's Rodrigo Chronicles,
and Derrick Bell's fictional narratives.29
The authors denounce storytelling for several reasons. First,
they argue that because radical stories tend to be about law profes
sors, lawyers, or litigants, those stories are atypical and unrepre
sentative, and thus distort rational debate on issues like merit (pp.
73, 77-78). Second, according to the authors, the stories overly em
phasize the unique perspective of radical authors (their "authentic
perspective"), and communities of color and white women fre
quently end up fighting over who has the right to speak on behalf of
28.

For an example of such an inquiry related to Jewish success, see Deborah Malamud,

The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action Debate, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. {forth

coming). For an example of a historical inquiry relating to Asian Americans, see THE AsIAN
AMEruCAN EouCATIONAL EXPERIENCE_ (Don T. Nakanishi & Tma Yamana Nishida eds.,
1995).
29. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 17; Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 liARv. L. REv. 4 {1985); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit
and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. LJ. 1711 {1995).
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particular groups (pp. 73, 78-83). Third, unlike conventional legal
argument, say the authors, stories are subject to multiple interpreta
tions because they lack clarity and analysis.3° Finally, Farber and
Sherry claim that radical authors tend to misinterpret and take too
personally any critique of their autobiographical stories as ad
hominem attacks, which makes any real exchange of ideas difficult,
if not altogether impossible (pp. 73-74, 88-94).
Throughout Farber and Sherry's argument, the reader detects a
distinct discomfort with attaching the label of legal scholarship to
any argument that does not take the conventional form. Indeed,
Farber and Sherry would appear to cast doubt on much legal argu
ment that is not perfectly statistically representative, does not pro
ceed in linear fashion Jrom argument to definitive conclusion, or is
not detached in a modernist, scholarly "we-are-just-stroking-our
chins-and-exploring-these-interesting-ideas" kind of way.
More importantly, the authors appear not to get, or at least to
be talking past, the point of storytelling as a genre of legal scholar
ship. That is, they wholly miss the radical argument that the choice
of which stories are "accurate," "valid" or "good scholarship" is a
political choice, which for its validity requires the suppression or
marginalization of alternative "counterstories" or descriptions that
are equally useful.
Take for example the authors' challenge to three "merit" stories
about discrimination in law faculty hiring. The authors take partic
ular issue with a fictional story told by Derrick Bell in 1985 about
hiring black recruits, a 1991 story by Patricia Williams about
Harvard's failure to hire a woman of color, and conflicting accounts
of an unsuccessful interview of a minority told by Richard Delgado
in 1988 (pp. 75-77). According to the authors, those stories are not
representative in light of the results of an American Association of
Law Schools ("AALS") study, in which the AALS collected data
on approximately half of law faculty hires.31 The authors choose to
privilege the AALS study, despite its limited scope and the fact that
it was conducted significantly later than the time period in which
the authors told their merit stories. The authors' AALS story about
"objective merit" becomes an ideological myth, which for its power
requires the suppression or marginalization of alternative counter
stories. And critical scholars are not the only ones telling those
counter stories. They are also told by authors like Richard Chused
30. Pp. 73, 84-86. In a rather bizarre moment, the authors tell two versions of a quite
disturbing story about Suzanna Sherry's mother, ostensibly to make a point about truth-tell
ing. Pp. ·112-16. I suspect, however, that Sherry's mother could not have been too happy
about either version of the story making it into print.
31. See pp. 77, 173 n.7 (citing Richard A. White, Statistical Report on the Gender and
Minority Composition ofNew Law Teachers and AALS Faculty Appointments Register Can
didates, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 424, 429-30 (1994)).
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- who, like Delgado, found in 1988 that minorities were woefully
underrepresented on law faculties, 3 2 and Deborah Merritt - who,
like Williams, found in 1997 (six years after Williams's work) that
women of color still suffered from a significant disadvantage in the
hiring process relative to white men and women. 3 3 The authors also
fail to point out that Harvard did not hire a tenure-track or tenured
woman of color until this year, a full seven years after Williams's
1991 story. 3 4
Farber and Sherry's more general argument is that storytelling
makes for bad scholarship because it deprives scholars of a common
agreed-upon language, in which facts can be empirically verified as
. "true or false, " stories have only one meaning, and the identity of
the author or the viewpoint of the reader is irrelevant to that mean
ing (p. 87). But in defining scholarly discourse in this way, Farber
and Sherry imply that the only knowledge worth being produced by
the legal academy is an argument that is authorless and
readerless, 3 5 that admits only of one meaning (traceable to the
"plain meaning "of the words that are used), and that is independ
ent of time, place, or history. To achieve their so-called universal
language for scholarship, the authors must exclude and marginalize
stories that depend for their "knowledge value " on information
about the writer, on the interpretive lens of the reader, or on analy
sis of a particular time, place, or event that may not be representa
tive for all people at all times. Farber and Sherry cannot really
mean that nothing of knowledge value is contributed when Patricia
Williams points out, in a voice that betrays her personal anger and
frustration, that as of 1991 Harvard had yet to hire permanently a
woman of color for a tenure-track position.
One final and relatively minor note. Despite Farber and
Sherry's implication to the contrary, radical scholars do not have a
monopoly on what the authors characterize as ad hominem attacks.
In fact, the authors engage in a bit of polemic themselves when they
lead off with a quote from Salman Rushdie, who thinks it important
to "name rubbish as rubbish, "(p. 1) and when they diagnose radical
theorists with a mild-to-extreme case of paranoia (p. 135).

32. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention ofMinorities and Women on Amer
ican Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537 (1988).
33. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The
Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 CowM. L. REv. 199 (1997).
34. Harvard hired Lani Guinier in January 1998. See Harvard Hires Ex-Clinton Nominee,
Jan. 24, 1998, at A7.
35. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep ofReason, 84 GEo. LJ. 453, 456 (1996) ("[N]either the
identity of the speaker nor her institutional role should be relevant to the persuasiveness of
an argument.").
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Judge Richard Posner, a fellow critic of radicals, cranks up the
level of polemic several steps on behalf of the authors in his review
of their book:
By exaggerating the plight of the groups for which they are the
self-appointed spokesmen, the critical race theorists come across as
whiners and wolf-criers. By forswearing analysis in favor of story
telling, they come across as labile and intellectually limited. By em
bracing the politics of identity, they come across as divisive . . . . Their
lodgment in law schools is a disgrace to legal education, which lacks
the moral courage and the intellectual self-confidence to pronounce a
minority movement's scholarship bunk.36

Posner's florid but forcefully phrased "attack prose" demon
strates that even a strictly empirical law and economics scholar can
degrade scholarly discourse with the best of them (and can throw
around fancy words like "lodgment," which like "hegemonic"
evokes a notion of being particularly well-entrenched). Indeed, af
ter reading Posner's expose on radical scholars' so-very-obvious
lack of merit, one wonders why Ivy League schools do not toss con
artists like Patricia Williams and Duncan Kennedy out into the
street. More darkly, one wonders why it is that, for Posner, these
scholars do not enjoy the presumption of merit that credentials like
Columbia and Harvard typically confer. Ultimately, Posner's
"scholarship" serves its purpose - it lays out very clearly his
deeply political conclusions about critical race scholars and minor
ity law professors. Neither he nor Farber and Sherry, however,
have left themselves much room to protest when a forthcoming re
sponse is equally politicized and forceful.
IV.

"THE LAST TIME I SAW RICHARD": RICHARD RORTY
RADICAL PRAGMATISM

AND

In Chapter Five, which is in many ways the centerpiece of the
book, Farber and Sherry contend that the radical critique of truth
and merit ought to be rejected because it destroys the notion of
democracy, and because it is nihilist and will lead to Holocaust de
nial and totalitarianism.
At the beginning of their penultimate chapter, the authors again
claim that they do not take a position on the idea of Truth with a
capital T, nor do they engage in the metaphysical inquiry into
whether one could ever verify the existence of external reality (p.
96). But the authors' failure to take a theoretical position on the
existence of truth and objectivity is, perhaps somewhat mislead
ingly, buried amidst foundationalist rhetoric. Because Farber and
Sherry want to be thought of as at least quasi-strong objectivists by
their mainstream public readership, lest they seem as crazy as the
36. Posner, supra note 4, at 43.
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authors they attack, they take some pains in the book to adopt what
appears to be the conventional line on rationalism. "What should
we seek and what should we speak if not the truth?" ask Farber and
Sherry. "The unhappy answers are politics, and political power" (p.
102).

In earlier articles, however, Farber and Sherry have been a bit
more open about the fact that theirs is only a pragmatist defense of
truth - they do not defend the existence of objective truth, but
rather argue that it is pragmatically useful to assume that objective
truth exists, or that we create truth as ways of organizing what
otherwise would be chaotic experience.37 As Sherry puts it, even if
there really is no such thing as objective reason, "unconnected to
power relationships, we tend to - and perhaps we must - behave
as if there were. "38
Downplaying that quite radical-sounding argument, in Beyond
Sherry make two broad pragmatic claims in
defense of objective truth and merit. First, they argue that without
the idea of objective truth and the scientific method, democratic
constitutionalism would not be possible (pp. 107-08). Second, they
claim that rationalism is essential because it gives us our best de
fense to atrocities like the denial of the Holocaust, totalitarianism,
and moral relativism.39

All Reason Farber and

Setting forth the first claim, Farber and Sherry contend that by
questioning the existence of truth, radical theory risks the end of
democracy and the collapse of rational civilization. Radical cri
tique, according to the authors, "has affinities with totalitarianism.
As part of the attack on the Enlightenment, the critique of truth
suffers from a tendency to reinforce pre-Enlightenment despotism"
(p. 106). In this quite formally rationalist vein, the authors argue
that democracy relies on objective truth and the scientific method
for its very existence:
[T]he aspiration toward truth and objective methods of seeking it are
integral to democratic constitutionalism. The two progeny of the En
lightenment, democracy and the scientific method so disparaged by
the radical multiculturalists, are indeed siblings. Both democracy and
the scientific method - empirical experimentation designed to ap-

37. See Sherry, supra note 35, at 472-73 (arguing that it would be pragmatically better to
pretend as though such things as objective truth and reason really did correspond to the
world around us). See also Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1338-39 (1988) (rejecting as overly foundationalist the idea that a deter
minate legal meaning can be deduced from original intent or shared community norms).
38. Sherry, supra note 35, at 473.
39. P. 108 ("(S]ocial constructionism creates a dilemma for those who believe that with
regard to the Holocaust, some claim to 'truth' appears particularly imperative: postmodern
thought's rejection of the possibility of identifying some stable reality or truth beyond the
constant . . . self-referentiality of linguistic constructs challenges the need to establish the
realities and the truths of the Holocaust") (internal quotes and citation omitted).
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proach objective truth - are closely related in their preference for
intellectual authority over institutional authority, their insistence on
universalism and objectivity, and their intellectual skepticism. In sci
ence as in democracy, what matters is not who says it but whether it is
right. [pp. 106-07]

In a quite scholarly way, Farber and Sherry preface this argu
ment with a quote from Richard Rorty, who at first glance appears
to support them in their anti-democracy, Holocaust-denial argu
ment: "Richard Rorty observes that although this insight is 'hard to
live with[,]' social constructionism means 'that when the secret po
lice come, when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing
to be said to them of the form 'There is something within you which
you are betraying' " (pp. 105-06).

In linking up radical theory with nihilism and Holocaust denial�
the authors do not argue that radical theorists are engaging in Hol
ocaust denial or advocating totalitarianism, though they come close
to accusing at least one Continental scholar of sympathizing with
Nazis.40 Rather, the authors claim that the radicals' denial of objec
tive truth can be misused in nihilistic fashion, to deny the existence
of the Holocaust, among other atrocities (p. 109). It is pragmati
cally useful to assume the existence of objective truth, the authors
conclude, because to do otherwise risks nihilism and anti-Semitism.

Skimming through the argument, the citation to Richard Rorty
catches our eye. Wait a second, back up just a bit. Isn't Richard
Rorty the pragmatist who promoted the idea that truth is socially
constructed, and who argued that democracy does not depend on or
require a theory of objective truth? Isn't he the same scholar who
argued that there is no such thing as nihilism if one no longer ac
cepts the idea of truth and objectivity? Why is it that the authors'
citation to Rorty makes no mention of the above? And why is
Rorty absent from the authors' lineup of radical scholars?
Rorty's antifoundationalist critique of objectivity and truth
surely is well-known to Farber and Sherry.41 Like the other radicals
whom the authors target - and perhaps the authors themselves in
their secret heart of hearts - Rorty argues that there is no Archi
medean point outside of language and social convention from
which to evaluate whether our ideas correspond to objective reality
or to some objective "out in the world" truth about the human per
sonality. Rorty argues that truth is the property of sentences in lan
guage that describe the world, and not a property of the world
itself: "The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are

40. P. 64 (repeating the off-levied charge that Paul De Man, a noted deconstructionist,
demonstrated Nazi sympathies when he wrote essays in a Belgian newspaper repudiating
Jewish influence in literature).
41. Farber cites to Rorty in several of his earlier articles. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 37,
at 1337 & n.29 (citing Rorty for a good introduction to the tenets of pragmatism).
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not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world
on its own - unaided by the describing activities of human beings
- cannot."42 For the pragmatist, "there is no pragmatic difference,
no difference that makes a difference, between 'it works because
it's true' and 'it's true because it works. "'43 Rorty carefully points
out, however, that he is not arguing that there is no such thing as
"the world out there," but only that we cannot ever know whether
our perceptions of the world correspond with what is out there.44
To the extent that we can never know whether our ideas about
merit or math or mountains match up to some objective "out there
in the world" or "human condition" reality, Rorty recommends that
we give up trying to find out, because the inquiry does not appear
to be particularly important, interesting, or useful. Rather than try
ing to make our social conventions and ideas correspond with ob
jective truth, argues Rorty, we should concentrate on what we do
know - whether engaging in certain practices and describing
things in a particular way is useful or productive for a particular
community, that is, whether it helps us to control or predict our
environments and lead happy lives.45
Like Rorty, the authors appear to favor (at least when they are
being "truthful") an approach to legal analysis that can be called
pragmatism. But the authors' version of pragmatism differs signifi
cantly from Rorty's. Farber and Sherry believe that our current
conceptions of truth, objectivity, and merit - as they correspond to
the real world out there - are essential and should be preserved
even if we don't "really" believe in them. In that sense, Farber's
and Sherry's pragmatism is a very narrow, conservative kind of
pragmatism that preserves much if not all of the conventional
worldview, and advocates little change, if any.46
In contrast, Rorty believes that truth and objectivity are not at
all useful for evaluating alternative frameworks of thinking, and in
fact he finds them quite counterproductive.47 Rorty's pragmatism
finds it much less important, at least at the level of the individual
person, to preserve conventional frameworks of thinking, and thus
allows for more far-reaching, thinking-outside-the-box progressive
change.
In addition, in terms of method, conservative pragmatists like
Farber and Sherry prefer to assimilate new and potentially contra
dictory information into old frameworks in order to disrupt them as
42. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY S (1989).
43. Id. at 8.
44. See id. at S, 13.
4S. See id. at 6, 14-lS, and SS.
46. See William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 612-13 (1994).
47. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at S.
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little as possible.48 In contrast, progressive pragmatists like Rorty
find it desirable, at least at the level of the private individual, to
break free from or to transcend those pre-existing frameworks or
worldviews. From a Rortian perspective,

[e] ach individual is a dynamic player in this game and makes her own
choices about which script to follow and what metaphors to employ.
While most individuals make conventional choices and accept the de
scriptions handed down to them, the triumphant player seeks escape
from inherited descriptions and formulates a cognitive framework of
her own. This redescription is valuable insofar as it is productive for
her life . . . .49

How does Rorty help us to respond to Farber's and Sherry's
pragmatic arguments in favor of rationalism? First, Rorty directly
contradicts the authors' initial argument that rationalism is required
to lay the foundation for democracy. In particular, Rorty argues
that "the vocabulary of Enlightenment rationalism, although it was
essential to the beginnings of liberal democracy, has become an im
pediment to the preservation and progress of democratic socie
ties. "50 According to Rorty, the argument that democracy requires
rationalism might have been useful when rationalism and the scien
tific method were in their heyday, but it is less useful post Kuhn and
Feyerabend, when the value of the scientific method is neither well
defined nor a particularly interesting source of description.51 For
Rorty, it is more useful to describe democracy as a collection of
shared beliefs about human solidarity and the need to reduce cru
elty than as an institutionalized expression of rational thought.52
Second, Rorty helps us to deal with the authors' claim that radi
cal theory inevitably results in nihilism. The authors argue that
without objective reason, there is no way to choose between com
peting claims or descriptions of the world, no way to refute Holo
caust denial or to denounce anti-Semitism. According to Rorty,
that argument begs the initial question: the nihilism argument per
suades the reader only if she has already decided that rationalism is
useful in adjudicating between competing language games. Only
those who already accept an Archimedean point from which to
choose the more "real" or "true" claim will find the idea of choos
ing a metaphysically grounded option to be a productive exercise.53
48. See Eskridge, supra note 46, at 613.
49. Id. at 623.
50. RoRTY, supra note 42, at 44.
51. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 51-52. Farber himself appears to agree with tbis propo
sition, at least partially. See Farber, supra note 37, at 1335-36 (citing with approval tbe intel
lectual move from unitary scientific method to a nonfoundationalist view of the scientific
enterprise).
52. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 141-98.
53. See id. at 44-45, 48-49.
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Of course, progressive is one step down from radical. Rorty
himself is open to the criticism that he is too conservative, because
he claims that one should experiment with alternative vocabularies
only at the level of the private individual, but not at the collective
level.54 In the next section, I try to sketch the outlines of a radical
pragmatism - not the conservative pragmatism of Farber and
Sherry, nor the progressive but ultimately limited pragmatism of
Rorty, but something that extends Rorty's progressive vision be
yond the private endeavor to social institutions.
A.

Radical Rorty: Progressive Pragmatism Modified

Pragmatism need not suffer from conservatism, banality, and
lack of ambition, nor from the limitations of a private individualist
pragmatism. In this section, I want to propose that, by highlighting
the way in which institutions gloss over difference and diversity in
the name of commonality and universality, radical theory can rein
vigorate pragmatism and rescue it from Farber and Sherry's ten
dency toward complacency and from the limits of Rorty's one
person revolution.
My version of radical pragmatism can be characterized by two
central propositions. First, in determining whether some particular
social practice is useful to an interpretive community, outsider
scholars should expose and highlight group differences within social
institutions. Radical pragmatists should seek to identify within an
interpretive community conflicts about what it means to be "use
ful," for whom something ought be useful, and what purposes social
institutions ought to serve.
Second, in generating scholarship that advocates for social
change, radical scholars should explicitly engage in a very local and
instrumentalist political argument. Radical pragmatists should gen
erate politically effective claims from the perspective of the out
sider, in order to advance those political commitments toward
including outsiders in the community, including alternative pur
poses in social institutions, and including revolutionary visions of
what it means to be "useful" in mainstream discourse.
1.

Problematizing Pragmatism: Identifying Difference

Pragmatism's central project - for both Rorty and the authors
- lies in describing practices or vocabularies in terms of whether
they are useful for a particular interpretive community in helping to
predict and control the community's environment. Radical prag
matism problematizes that inquiry, to highlight not commonality
54. See e.g., Joan C. Williams Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze,
1992 Wis. L. RE.v. 131; Joseph William Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?,
1989 DuKE L.J. 1752, 1757-59 (book review).
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and universality but difference and conflict within social institu
tions. Beyond seeking to find what is useful for a community, radi
cal pragmatism asks three additional questions that are designed to
take into account the exercise of social and institutional power.
Initially, radical pragmatism adds the question "useful for what
purpose or political commitment?" Posing that question should
help to expose the internal power conflicts that might beset an in
terpretive community in coming to consensus on the purpose of a
particular social institution. For example, Farber and Sherry might
argue that the purpose of selection processes like law school admis
sions standards should be to maximize human productivity in a fair
way. Rorty and his cohorts might argue that the purpose of selec
tion processes should be to minimize cruelty and suffering for those
who are traditionally disenfranchised. Radicals might argue that, in
light of historical patterns of exclusion, selection processes should
be designed to enhance the participation of all groups in human
institutions.

All three visions might co-exist in the same community. Hence,
in working through pragmatic inquiries, it is important to expose
the conflicting political commitments about the appropriate pur
pose of a social institution. Asking the "useful for what purpose"
question helps to identify and then contest the suppressed conflicts
behind a purportedly common purpose.
To be sure, purposes are often not fully articulable until after
the social institution has been around for awhile. Asking the "for
what purpose" question will reveal that purpose is often still in
evolution. As Rorty points out, often we cannot articulate the pur
pose of a vocabulary or language game until after the vocabulary
has fully developed.ss
Second, radical pragmatism asks "useful for whom? Who is in
cluded in the relevant community and who is excluded?"S6 By ask
ing that question, radical pragmatism exposes the exclusion that
necessarily must take place when defining a purportedly universal
community (for example, "the global economy," "Americans").
The notion of community has meaning only if it includes a defined
set of people, which necessarily requires excluding a defined set of
other people. Our American political community, for example, ex
cludes for certain political purposes foreign nationals, immigrants
who have not been authorized to immigrate, children, people with
mental disabilities, and criminals. Likewise, the American commu
nity may have defined its American-ness by excluding communities
of color from the political community.
55. See RoRTY, supra note 42, at 12-13, 55.
56. See Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710

(1996) (asking the question "who is we?").

1680

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 96:1658

In defending conventional meritocracy, Farber and Sherry ap
pear to define meritocracy in a way that includes Jews - and to a
lesser extent Asian Americans - who have achieved under tradi
tional merit standards. Indeed, the authors acknowledge that it is
legitimate to evaluate an institution on the basis of its usefulness for
- or impact on - certain social groups like Jews or Asians. To be
sure, preserving conventional meritocracy might be useful for those
groups, and for the dominant majority in the privileged position at
the top. But it appears far less useful for Latina/os and blacks, who
are disproportionately excluded by conventional merit standards.
Finally, radical pragmatism asks "what does it mean to be use
ful?" During a recent debate at the University of Illinois College of
Law between Professor Farber and myself, we agreed that it was
important to ask whether conventional meritocratic law school ad
missions standards were useful to blacks and Latina/os, as well as to
Jews and Asians, but we disagreed on what we meant by useful.57 I
argued that usefulness should be measured by whether selection
criteria put people of color immediately into positions of power and
responsibility, so that they could decide what counts as merit and
what the legal profession should look like. Farber thought that such
a measure was short-sighted and argued that it would be more use
ful to measure success by conventional merit standards, and to pro
mote long-term success via education.58
Certainly, we could not resolve our disagreement purely by ref
erence to empirical or rationalist analysis. Ours is a disagreement
that springs from our differing political commitments. But by ask:.
ing the question of what it means to call a practice "useful," we
were able to expose that important political difference and debate
it.
The answers to these questions - what does it mean to be use
ful, useful for whom, and for what purpose - invariably will be a
function of differing political commitments, group affiliations and
worldviews. The differences that these questions expose are thus
"rationally undecidable," because choices between them cannot be
grounded in anything outside of contingent political commitments,
affiliations or worldviews.
Once uncovered, those differences can become the locus of
struggle at the collective level. Unlike conservative pragmatism,
which seeks to preserve conventional frameworks of thinking, and
progressive pragmatism, which seeks to transcend convention at the
private level, radical pragmatism seeks to transcend convention at
the level of the social institution, so that difference can become the

57. See Debate Between Daniel Farber and Daria Roithmayr, University of Illinois Col·
lege of Law (Oct. 10, 1997).
58. See id.
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subject of political struggle. By highlighting difference, radical
pI!agmatism attempts to avoid the relative complacency that charac
terizes conservatives like Farber and Sherry, who are more inter
ested in refurbishing existing institutions with new pragmatic.
justifications. By extending the pragmatic inquiry to the level of the
social institution, radical pragmatism seeks to transcend the limits
of Rortian pragmatism, which promotes the private pursuit of prag
matism while preserving social life in the conventional liberal mold.
2.

Deciding the Undecidable: Political Persuasion

The essence of political struggle is trying to come to terms with
those rationally undecidable differences amidst the exercise of so
cial power. Stanley Fish writes that radical theory has had little if
anything to say about the all-important political argument, which
takes place after radical theory has cleared from the table claims to
�'truth" and "objectivity."59 How then ought radical pragmatists to
engage in political struggle?
·

Of course, the most difficult political struggle involves compet
ing political commitments and mutually exclusive positions, particu
larly where one commitment enjoys a privileged position over an
"outsider commitment." To resolve that difficulty, Farber and
Sherry claim that reason constitutes the universal language that cuts
across, and can resolve all differences between, conflicting perspec
tives. "[B]ecause we are all engaged in a common search for truth,
'political decisions [must] be made through persuasion by a shared
language . . . " (p. 107).
From the progressive pragmatist perspective, Rorty argues that
consensus about conflicting vocabularies or approaches is gener
ated through a conversation undistorted by power in which each
participant appeals to the commitments of the other, a sort of dia
lectical give and take in a "free and open encounter."6° To give the
open and free encounter some hope of usefulness, Rorty relies on
what he sees as a human ability to empathize or identify with the
outsider who does not share conventionally privileged political
commitments, group affiliations, or worldviews.61

In contrast, radical theorists like Ernesto Laclau point out that
consensus will only form when one group is able to exercise power
over other groups, by suppressing other alternative descriptions of
59. STANLEY F1sH, THERE'S No SucH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND !T's A Gooo TmNG
Too 178-79 (1994).
60. RoRTY, supra note 42, at 60.
61. See id.
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the world and painting their approach or vocabulary as natural or
inevitable.62
My version of radical pragmatism does not depend either on
. Farber and Sherry's universal reason or Rorty's undistorted, em
pathetic conversation to promote the interests of the disen
franchised. Radical pragmatist method takes its direction more
from Laclau's vision of the exercise of political power. However,
radical pragmatism does not prescribe only one way of struggling
against that power.
Rather, radical pragmatism - from the perspective of the out
sider - is explicitly, perhaps crassly, instrumentalist. It exhorts
people of color and other outsiders to focus on the objective of ad
vancing radical political commitments to empowerment and eman
cipation. Depending on the particular and local context, we radical
scholars ought to use conservative, progressive or radical pragma
tist methods, or some combination thereof, when it would be useful
in advancing radical political commitments to do so.
For some issues and in certain historical, social, and economic
and political circumstances, radical scholars may want to (and do)
engage in political argument in a relatively conservative way, by
pointing out where certain radical political commitments already
exist in mainstream thought. For example, in a forthcoming article
I want to defend affirmative action programs as a species of anti
trust intervention, designed to break up the monopoly that whites
have in the competition for resources and opportunities. Such an
argument makes use of existing categories of legal thought to ad
vance a radical political commitment to affirmative action.
In other circumstances, given other histories and social forces
and economic pressures, radical scholars should (and do) spend
time in coming up with progressive or even revolutionary social
metaphors, in the hopes that some of these redescriptions will
prove useful to particular people. For example, radical scholars
have generated a multitude of innovative ways to think about race
relations. Critical race scholars recently have redescribed the state
of contemporary race relations by hybridizing the concept of race
with geography or post-colonialism.63 Using theories of cultural
pluralism, Professor Duncan Kennedy has argued that affirmative
action programs are necessary to put into positions of power and
responsibility people of color, who have been excluded from all
62. Ernesto Laclau, Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony, in DECONSTRUCTION AND
60-61 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996).
63. See JosE D. SALDIVAR, THE DIALECTICS OF OuR AMEruCA: GENEALOGY, CUL
TURAL CRITIQUE, AND LITERARY HISTORY (1991) (discussing race and postcolonialism);
Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segrega
tion, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (1997); Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsi
bility and Interracial Justice, 33 AsIAN PAc. AM. L.J. 33 (1995) (discussing post-colonialism).
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previous decisionmaking about what counts as merit.64 Radical the
ory - which demonstrates the contingency of descriptions, their
historical role in perpetuating the exercise of social power, and
their revisability - opens the possibility of completely revolution
ary vocabularies to capture the social imagination and incite social
transformation.
But pragmatic inquiry should guide the postmodernist approach
to social change. Radical scholars should decide whether, in a par
ticular local context, political commitments towards including out
siders might be better advanced through revolutionary social
rupture - when it might be useful to dispense wholesale with con
ventional ways of thinking - or whether a more progressive or
conservative approach might better serve radical aims. Revolution
ary redescription may be the most advisable option in some cases
but also may be the least advisable in others.
Toward that end, radical scholars should generate in neo-Dar
winist fashion as many new metaphors about outsider/insider rela
tions as possible - some deconstructive, some progressive, some
conservative - to increase the likelihood that one of these meta
phors will "take," that is, will advance radical political commit
ments and move us in new, more useful directions. Radical scholars
should also work to change the social, political and economic envi
ronments in which those metaphors will be received. But the lode
star that ought guide radical scholars in our choice of how to engage
in political struggle is "what works to advance radical political com
mitments to outsiders' emancipation?"

CoNCLUSION: "IT's You AND ME AGAINST THE WoRLD"
As the previous section indicates, I found Farber and Sherry's
book a quite provocative point for starting important and serious
conversation about how we ought to think about our social
institutions.

I should also point out that there are several areas on which I
agree with the authors. For example, as the foregoing section indi
cates, I think that they are right in focusing political disagreements
on pragmatic questions of usefulness, though they do so in a disin
genuous fashion and with a brand of pragmatism that is too conven
tionally rationalist. I also agree, although they do not make this
point explicitly, that radical scholars ought to devote far more at
tention to engaging in political struggle with the mainstream, r�ther
than talking - as law professors are wont to do - only to each
other.
64. See Kennedy, supra note 15, at 712-14.

1684

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1658

I do not know whether I would put Farber and Sherry on the
other side of the front line of the battle between radicals and ratio
nalists. It certainly seems as though the authors themselves, and
their comrades, would position them there. In his review of Beyond
All Reason for The New York Times, Judge Alex Kozinski paints a
picture of impending radical takeover very similar to that portrayed
by Farber and Sherry in their book. He lauds the authors as brave
pioneers, willing to risk their own professional hides and speak out
'
despite the potential personal cost:
While traditional liberals still dominate the law schools in terms of
numbers, they are mostly a cowardly lot, unwilling to risk their peace
ful careers to tell the alarming truth to the world outside. In writing
this book, Farber and Sherry have taken a personal risk. If those of us
outside the academy fail to take heed, we will not be able to say we
were not warned. 65 -

In the law school war between radical and rationalist academics,
has the radicals' position on radicalism really begun to sweep the
legal academy? If not, then the authors themselves must suffer
from a bit of paranoia. If so, isn't it Farber and Sherry who now
have become the radicals, at least in the academic world? If (as
Judge Kozinski argues) academics all agree that there is no such
thing as objective truth and the concepts of equality and merit are
"a bit quaint and dated - like stale granola,"66 Farber and Sherry
would appear to be just two radical dissenters seeking to overthrow
the postmodern views of the academic world. Perhaps we ought to
buy them each a beret.

65. Kozinski, supra note 8, at 46. Similarly, as discussed supra note 8, Farber and Sherry
note that, prior to taking on the book, they had been warned against making their argument
(obviously, to no avail). P. 14.
66. Kozinski, supra note 8, at 46.

